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 Historians who launch their narratives with great men, pivotal dates, and legislative 
milestones are almost certainly guilty of crude reductionism. Yet it is hard to resist 
beginning with Germany’s Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–98) and the passage in 
1883 of his  Gesetz betreff end die Krankenversicherung der Arbeiter (Law Concerning the 
Health Insurance of the Worker ), which is widely held to be the foundation of health pro-
vision under the modern welfare state. 1 Bismarck’s purpose was to institute a compul-
sory system for insuring waged labourers against sickness by providing income 
replacement and medical care funded with shared contributions from employers and 
employees. Th is was by no means the earliest example of organized sickness insurance, 
which was already deeply rooted in European civil society, and nor was it the fi rst time 
the state had mandated income transfers on behalf of the sick: in Britain this may be 
traced to the Tudor Poor Laws. Th e novelty of Bismarck’s strategy lay rather in the use of 
compulsion to broaden the risk pool beyond selective groups and to undergird the 
fi nancing of collective sickness cover. In so doing, this German statute signalled an 
unprecedented incursion by the state into the arena of curative medicine and raised 
public interest questions about the behaviour of private actors who sold medical serv-
ices, whether in primary care, hospitals, or pharmaceuticals. 
 Germany’s experiment exerted considerable infl uence in the industrialized nations 
over subsequent decades, though with much local variation. For example, Denmark 
(1885) and Belgium (1894) responded by bolstering voluntary insurance with privi-
leges and public subsidies, while Norway and Britain (both in 1911) introduced com-
pulsion and employer contributions broadly on the Bismarckian model; France 
followed in 1930. War and political turbulence in the 1930s and 1940s did not sweep 
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social insurance aside and from the mid-twentieth century these systems were the 
foundation on which universal population coverage was built. New Zealand (1941) 
was fi rst to achieve this in the capitalist world, though like Britain (1948) it chose to do 
so on the basis of general taxation. Others advanced towards universalism using the 
insurance principle, whether through private, employer-based, voluntary, or public 
funds. Th e exception was the United States, still famously ‘alone amongst the devel-
oped nations’ at the millennium in lacking universal coverage. 2 Here public pro-
grammes were debated several times aft er 1916, but rejected in favour of private or 
non-profi t insurance and the more limited Medicaid and Medicare schemes in the 
1960s. 
 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, then, health care increasingly became an 
aspect of the economic and social policy of nation-states and the purpose here is to sur-
vey this political economy of medicine. Th e main aim is to account for the coming of 
health systems within welfare states, but also to examine how these systems responded 
to demographic, fi nancial, and technological changes in the contemporary period. 
Constraints of space dictate a focus on major industrial economies of the capitalist 
world, to the exclusion of communist states and of low- and middle-income countries. 
Socialist systems are historically important because they treated health as a common 
right of citizenship to be met through central planning, while transitional and poorer 
nations illuminate the enduring legacy of imperialism: both are explored elsewhere in 
this volume. Further exclusions arise from my methodology, a comparative analysis of 
national cases selected to exemplify diff erent models of health system. Typologies are 
legion (‘entrepreneurial, welfare-oriented, comprehensive’, ‘private, pluralistic, national 
health insurance, national health service’, and so on), although the relative importance 
of private and public forms of fi nancing and provision has typically underpinned classi-
fi cation. 3 Here I discuss the United States because it has prioritized private and volun-
tary arrangements, Britain and Sweden because they demonstrate universal and 
comprehensive coverage largely with the state delivering services, and France, Germany, 
and Japan because they illustrate the social insurance principle, alongside a regulated 
private sector. 
 Th rough most of history, medical encounters in the West were individualized mar-
ket transactions or occurred in institutions organized by religion and charity. Th e 
question of why the state entered, and then came to dominate, this arena in the recent 
past is therefore of over-arching importance, and the fi rst section summarizes the 
main theoretical approaches advanced to explain this process. Th e second section 
outlines the nineteenth-century foundations of social insurance and public provision 
of medical facilities on which state engagement was built. Th e following sections trace 
the growth and development of health systems in the case-study countries, dividing 
events into three broad periods: the early twentieth century, in which they were largely 
put in place; the post-war ‘golden-age’ of the welfare state; and attempts since the 1970s 
to reform health systems in response to burgeoning costs and ideological critique. Th e 
conclusion refl ects on how the diff erent models adopted have impacted on population 
health. 
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 From a methodological perspective it is important to recognize that health care has 
been a subject of fi erce, sometimes vituperative, debate in recent democratic politics, 
and the Anglophone comparative literature is inevitably infl uenced by this. In particu-
lar, the ‘lessons’ that Europe might supply to their own country marks the work of 
American scholars. Nor is the terminology transparent or value free, since tropes such 
as ‘health security’ and ‘socialized medicine’ carry current political resonance. Even the 
common term ‘health system’, which helpfully denotes national arrangements for the 
fi nancing, provision, and regulation of health care, is not neutral, dating to the interwar 
period when its usage signifi ed the desirability of service integration and collective 
fi nancing instead of an unfettered marketplace. 
 Theorizing health system histories 
 Th eoretical analysis of the emergence of health systems is intertwined with the larger 
problem of explaining the welfare states of which they are a part. Evidently these were 
products of economic modernization, for industrialization generated the surplus wealth 
to fund insurance or tax-based services while also removing existing supports of kin-
ship, church, guilds, and paternalism. 4 But what was the process by which new forms of 
social protection emerged? One approach treats them as an essentially pragmatic reac-
tion to the dislocations caused by economic liberalism. Th us, for example, Polanyi 
looked to anthropology to demonstrate the embeddedness of reciprocity and redistri-
bution in human behaviour, and treated social legislation as ‘protective counter-moves’ 
against the inherently ‘self-destructive mechanism’ of free markets and the risks posed 
to life and labour in the industrial cities. 5 Readings such as this minimize the importance 
of agency: welfarism was driven neither by class politics nor ideology; instead it ‘simply 
responded to the needs of an industrial civilization with which market methods were 
unable to cope’. 6 
 Modernization theorists with a Marxist perspective place greater emphasis on the 
interests of ruling classes in eff ecting change. First, welfare states subsidized capital in 
reproducing labour power, with health and education fostering human capital, and 
they sustained economic effi  ciency, with pensions and social security regulating the 
labour market and maintaining demand. 7 Second, they mediated the class tensions to 
which industrialization gave rise. Welfare legislation was ‘property’s ransom for secu-
rity’ and the redistributive elements of health systems a concession made to legitimize 
the social order and stave off  revolutionary change. 8 A prime piece of evidence is the 
‘Imperial Message’ introducing Bismarck’s legislation, which stressed the ameliorative 
value of health insurance in the wake of laws prohibiting political activities of labour 
organizations: ‘the healing of social wrongs must be sought not solely through the 
repression of social democratic excesses but by positively advancing the well-being of 
the workers’. 9 However, neither ‘productivist’ nor ‘legitimation’ theories seem wholly 
adequate, given the scale of redistribution and the advance of equity that were 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 04/15/11, SPi
0001275149.INDD   431 4/15/2011   10:03:19 PM
   martin gorsky
achieved. Surely effi  ciency and social conciliation could have been purchased more 
cheaply? 
 Perhaps then explanation should concentrate on political structures and the march of 
democracy in the West? Th e British case illustrates best the contention articulated by 
T. H. Marshall that the extension of political citizenship brought with it the ‘social citizen-
ship’ of welfare entitlement. 10 First came the 1867 Reform Act, which enfranchised work-
ing-class males, followed by the declaration by Tory premier Disraeli that ‘the fi rst 
consideration of a Minister should be the health of the people’. 11 Public Health Acts in the 
1870s extended the duties and capacities of municipal government in such areas as isola-
tion hospital provision and environmental improvement. Th e principle of health as a 
public good, funded by taxation, became entrenched, and henceforth occupied the party 
programmes that wooed voters. Moreover, once certain social groups gained health ben-
efi ts, democratic politics empowered others to achieve extensions of entitlement. 
Unfortunately though, there is no straightforward causal link between democratization 
and expanding health coverage. Imperial Germany cannot be deemed a vigorous partici-
patory democracy in which notions of entitlement and rights were paramount. 
Conversely in the United States, where democracy had arrived early (at least among white 
American males), voters rejected national health insurance; indeed, the only referendum 
held on the issue, in 1917 in California, was decisive: 133,000 for, 358,000 against. 
 Perhaps then a more satisfactory explanation of the diff ering forms and chronologies 
of national health systems lies with the political orientation of the protagonists who cre-
ated or denied them. At the most general level explanation alludes to ingrained cultural 
values. For example, the Swedish emphasis on equality is traced right back to the Middle 
Ages, arising from the absence of serfdom and discernible in the Viking parliaments. 12 
Conversely, America’s comparatively late and limited recourse to mandated health cov-
erage is attributed to its attachment to liberty, that ‘dominant individualism’, born of 
colonial rebellion and the frontier. 13 Such nebulous appeals to national values are, how-
ever, hard to demonstrate empirically; for example, US opinion survey data from both 
the 1940s and 1990s revealed majorities in favour of more extensive state intervention 
than actually occurred. 14 
 A more promising approach may therefore be to emphasize the social bases of welfare 
reform politics. Th e pre-eminent example of this treats social insurance as the achieve-
ment of the organized left , with the degree of egalitarianism determined by the strength 
of the labour movement allied with socialist parties. Scandinavia provides the  locus clas-
sicus , with the universal coverage and equitable access of the Swedish health system 
attributed to the long period of Social Democrat parliamentary dominance in the mid- 
and late twentieth century. Th e creation of the British National Health Service (NHS) 
during a rare interregnum in which Labour held a sweeping parliamentary majority is 
another example. Again though, the ‘labour mobilization’ thesis fails to provide a com-
prehensive explanation. Th e extension of post-war coverage in countries like France and 
Germany, from limited social insurance in the late 1940s to almost universal inclusion 
by the 1960s, was not the outcome of a left wards shift , but rather of the changing inter-
ests of other groups. 15 
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 A compelling version of the socio-political account therefore concentrates on under-
standing these solidaristic moments, in which working- and middle-class interests 
aligned suffi  ciently to enable the enactment of welfare legislation. Th e notion of solidar-
ism is not understood in ethical terms, as middle-class humanitarianism, but rather as 
the outcome of self-interest, for all may stand to gain from universalist or egalitarian 
health systems. Th us, in Baldwin’s words, a social constituency’s attitude to welfare is 
determined not by its ‘relations to the means of production’, but rather its ‘relations to 
the means of security’. 16 For example, in this light, Swedish progress towards universal 
coverage is better explained by the ‘red-green alliance’ of a powerful left  and an agrarian 
party that wanted health insurance extended to the farming sector. 
 Complementing this argument is the position of the institutionalists, such as 
Immergut, who argue that solidaristic alliances alone are not suffi  cient to explain change 
or stasis. For them the over-arching determinant is the political framework in which 
health care legislation is debated and the scope which institutional structures provide 
for opponents to frustrate reform. A strong executive committed to change and reliant 
on unifi ed party support may override hostile interest groups like private insurers, pro-
fessional associations and pharmaceutical companies: the treatment of the British 
Medical Association (BMA) by Lloyd George in 1911 and Bevan in 1946–8 are cases in 
point. However, executive will and broad social support for change can be frustrated if 
the political system contains suffi  cient ‘veto points’ at which interest groups may block 
legislation. Th e United States, with its loose party discipline, tolerance of pressure group 
fi nancial activities, and its legislative process of passage through House, Senate, and 
congressional committees, provides many such veto points, where arguably successive 
health bills have foundered. 
 One interest group above all dominates histories of the political economy of medi-
cine. In entering the fi eld of health, the state challenged the independence of the 
medical profession. Whether through its role in purchasing or providing health serv-
ices, the welfare state threatened doctors’ cherished rights to diagnose and prescribe 
as they considered best. More prosaically its monopoly power might also drive down 
the price they charged. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the con-
solidation of professional associations promoted the interests of trained practition-
ers by diff erentiating them from the many irregulars jostling in the medical 
marketplace. Th us not only did doctors have local and national organizations through 
which to combat proposals they disliked, but they also had the expertise vital to the 
functioning of health systems. Th is gave them greater leverage than other producer 
groups within welfare states, in the pressure politics that determined the form health 
systems took. 
 Th e discussion that follows will not attempt to distil a unitary theory from this con-
tested terrain of welfare state historiography. However, it will allude to cases when pro-
ductivism and legitimation seem to have motivated the hierarchical imposition of 
reform. It will also highlight the diff erent institutional structures in which social con-
stituencies were mobilized and interest groups operated. First, though, how were health 
services delivered prior to the entry of the state? 
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 Before the welfare state 
 Th e precursors to national health insurance were the contributory sickness funds that 
fl ourished in the nineteenth century, and whose own institutional antecedents were the 
early modern craft  guilds. Th ese were corporate bodies whose main purpose was the 
economic regulation of a skilled trade, but which also had welfare roles. Th e emergence 
of journeymen’s associations concerned specifi cally with burial and health insurance, 
and funded by fi xed dues, was apparent by the mid-eighteenth century. A transition 
from craft  guilds to ‘friendly societies’ based on networks other than occupation seems 
to have occurred fi rst in Britain, where membership expanded particularly (though not 
exclusively) in the heartlands of the Industrial Revolution. Alehouse sociability for 
male workers coloured their world and enshrined an ethic of patriarchal stewardship 
through collective endeavour. ‘Open’ societies emerged in other countries, such as 
post-revolutionary France, where  mutualités were associated with locality and church, 
and Sweden, where they fl ourished in large towns. Income replacement was the key 
benefi t, with the formal involvement of medical practitioners only gathering pace dur-
ing the nineteenth century, fi rst as ‘gatekeepers’ of the fund, authorizing claims and 
vetting neophytes to avert adverse selection, and only later providing medical treat-
ment to speed recovery. 
 States had shown an interest in these mutual associations long before 1883, in part 
because they promised to reduce the tax burden of the local poor law. In Prussia, com-
munities were empowered to enforce membership (1845, 1848) in either occupational or 
locally run funds, and from 1854 this became mandatory in mining and foundries. Policy 
might also be aimed at strengthening the security of the funds, as with the British strat-
egy of encouraging investment in government stock at preferential rates. Another con-
cern was to detach the welfare role of workers’ sickness funds from the industrial 
activities of organized labour. For example, German legislation in 1876 limited them to 
benefi t functions, though also establishing the enduring principles of employer contri-
butions and self-government. In France, Bonapartist policy (1852) gave preferential 
treatment to mutuals managed and fi nancially supported by local elites, thus lending the 
movement a ‘rigidly conservative’ character. 17 Aft er 1883 some liberal states continued 
this approach of bolstering voluntary insurance as a deliberate alternative to the 
Bismarckian model. Th us France’s Mutual Charter (1898) permitted diversifi cation and 
mergers, as well as boosting state subsidies, a strategy also adopted in Sweden (1891) in 
preference to compelling employer contributions. 
 For all their pioneering work, mutualist associations did not succeed in extending 
insurance throughout the population. Leaving aside the issue of achieving actuarial via-
bility during a period of falling mortality and rising morbidity, the key challenge was the 
stability and level of income required to fund subscription over the life course. While 
they were certainly not the sole preserve of the skilled working class there were clear 
limits to coverage: Britain (12.5 of the population in 1872) was slightly ahead of 
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Germany (9.5); 18 Sweden’s membership was predominantly urban, and only took off  
following the start of subsidies; while French mutualism similarly relied on subsidies 
and honorary contributions. In America, coverage was extensive among the industrial 
workforce, though excluded medical attendance. And although the mutualist savings 
model was not solely Western, Japan seems to have had no similar precedent; here dom-
iciliary medical care was privately remunerated, with doctors paid twice yearly, nomi-
nally for the drugs they prescribed. 
 Communal arrangements for providing hospitals for the poor also have a distant 
history, in medieval charitable foundations endowed by urban elites. Th e entry of the 
modern state may be dated to the seventeenth century, with the building of the French 
 hôpitaux généraux and the British urban workhouses. Initially intended to discipline 
mendicants, in practice the ‘great confi nement’ soon became limited to orphans and 
the nursing care of the chronic sick, with limited medical attendance. Mental health 
was another area where market and philanthropy proved insuffi  cient and in Britain, 
for example, the early nineteenth century saw the start of an asylum-building pro-
gramme based on local taxation. Alongside these institutions were charity hospitals, 
for the poor, in which acute medicine was practised and teaching delivered. Poor law 
approaches were also adopted in the United States, where public ‘almshouses’ accom-
modating the elderly, the mentally ill, and vagrants gradually became diff erentiated by 
specialism. 
 Distinctive trajectories emerged in the nineteenth century. Philanthropy proved 
insuffi  cient to sustain the expansion of American voluntary hospitals, and patient pay-
ments became accepted practice; the proliferation of smaller proprietary hospitals fur-
ther embedded the acceptance of user fees. Diff erent again was Scandinavia, where the 
insuffi  ciency of aristocratic philanthropy put the onus onto the ‘welfare municipality’. 19 
In Sweden, the creation of county councils with powers of tax raising and hospital 
administration (1862) accelerated new foundations staff ed by salaried physicians; here 
poverty and low population density impeded the growth of private medicine and most 
practitioners relied at least in part on a public appointment. Th e state also loomed large 
in Japan, though here as a result of the Meiji policy decision to replace indigenous heal-
ing with European biomedicine; there had been no prior tradition of charitable provi-
sion and beyond the medical schools public institutions were limited to a few military 
and municipal poor hospitals. 
 Crudely then, while Scandinavia’s unitary tax-funded hospitals laid the foundations 
of a ‘social democratic’ model, elsewhere a ‘liberal democratic’ model obtained, in 
which public institutions catered mainly to the dependent poor and voluntary or pro-
prietary hospitals to the ‘respectable’ population. 20 Stigma and under-resourcing 
attached to the former, status and scientifi c repute to the latter, though by 1900 both 
types of institution still intended their services for poorer people. Th is though was 
starting to change, as rising faith in biomedicine, post-Pasteur, coupled with techno-
logical transformation made hospital admission attractive to the middle class. Shift ing 
patterns of demand and the escalating costs of medical care posed new questions of 
access and funding for governments. 
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 Health systems in welfare states 
 1883–1945: Social insurance versus private interests 
 As noted above, the case of Germany is fundamental to understanding the coming of 
health systems in welfare states. First it is important to correct two misconceptions about 
1883. Th ough associated with Bismarck, credit for the legislation belongs to Th eodor 
Lohmann (1831–1905), a Christian social reformer and civil servant. Lohmann’s interest 
lay in integrating the worker into society through institutions that furthered moral 
development, in contrast to Bismarck’s more autocratic notion of binding the subject to 
the state: hence the reform built on existing mutual aid associations, rather than a single 
bureaucratic fund preferred by Bismarck. More crucially, new research has revealed that 
Bismarck’s prime motivation was not to pacify the left . Instead his ‘carrot and stick’ rhet-
oric was primarily designed to satisfy the Kaiser and sceptics in the Reichstag. Th e real 
agenda, fi rst with accident insurance, the precursor, and then with health insurance, was 
to aid German productivity. Compulsory coverage against accidents streamlined a sys-
tem becoming mired in costly workmen’s compensation cases while sickness insurance 
also aimed to boost economic growth, not least by aiding the mobility of labour. 21 Th us 
‘legitimation’ now seems less important than ‘productivism’ in explaining the fi rst case 
of state intervention. 
 Th ese factors can also be discerned in the enactment of national health insurance 
(NHI) in Britain (1911) and Japan (1926). Of course, this is also explicable as a policy 
transfer: the German innovation had its adherents among Japanese and British civil 
servants. However, both nations legislated at a time of incipient labour movement 
strength and in neither case was NHI part of the social democratic programme. Britain’s 
Labour Party had recently won its fi rst election victories and trade union membership 
had climbed steeply to 2.5 million in 1907. 22 Th e background to Japan’s Health Insurance 
Act was the growth of a socialist movement, the granting of universal male suff rage 
(1926), and the repressive Peace Preservation Act (1925), which proscribed left ist groups. 
Th e importance of population health to imperial economies also loomed large. Th e 
debilitated state of army recruits in the Boer War had scandalized British public opinion 
and the welfare reform era also inaugurated a school medical service. Nationalist and 
militarist imperatives in Japan drove the expansion of NHI beyond large companies by 
establishing subsidized, locally based funds to cover the self-employed in rural areas 
(1938), then incorporating white-collar workers (1941) so that coverage exceeded 70 
by 1943. 
 Germany, the pioneer, was also fi rst to confront the inherent confl ict between pro-
vider interests and NHI funds, as growing coverage threatened the market for private 
medicine. Doctors formed a national association, the ‘Hartmannbund’, and in 1911 
forced two key concessions, a free choice of physician by the insured and payment based 
on fee for service determined by the doctor. Soon aft er, in 1913, corporatist regional 
machinery was established through which doctors could negotiate with funds to resolve 
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contentious issues such as remuneration. Britain by contrast drove a tougher bargain, 
conceding free choice of doctors on a local ‘panel’, but remunerating according to capita-
tion (the number of patients on a practitioner’s list) with the level set well below that 
demanded by the BMA. Th e result though was to discourage doctors from treating the 
insured as generously as their private patients, and to embed a less expansive approach 
in the British system. 
 As the viability and popularity of NHI became evident, other liberal states confronted 
the interest politics standing in the way of its establishment. France’s preference for vol-
untary solutions was undermined by the 1919 peace settlement, in which it regained 
Alsace-Lorraine from Germany, incorporating a population enjoying Bismarckian 
health insurance. French labour endorsed proposals for NHI (though not the commu-
nists) and solidaristic support deepened as the petite bourgeoisie recognized the advan-
tages to be gained from access to hospital care. Observing the political mood, centrist 
doctors struck a compromise, accepting NHI in return for concessions. Th us the Social 
Insurance Law (1930) made enrolment in the existing mutuals compulsory for blue- 
collar employees, extending by 1939 to about half the population. It also enshrined a 
‘medical charter’ guaranteeing free choice of practitioner and remuneration by fee for 
service, with reimbursement claimed by the patient, not the doctor. Solidarism and a 
favourable institutional context eased the process in Sweden, which in 1931 advanced 
towards NHI through rationalizing the subsidy system for mutuals and standardizing 
their medical benefi ts. Here reform proposals emanated from the Liberals and a consen-
sus including social democrats and employers was forged within a committee system, 
through which pre-legislative objections were resolved outside the politicized parlia-
mentary arena. Although the Swedish Medical Association appealed to conservative 
politicians to veto change the latter were unwilling to disrupt this accord. 
 In the United States meanwhile, reform eff orts met with failure. In the 1910s NHI pro-
posals for blue-collar workers were put forward by Progressive intellectuals and the 
American Association for Labor Legislation, based largely on productivist arguments. 
Several state legislatures discussed and rejected such plans, before war with Germany 
and isolationist suspicion of European innovations terminated the policy debate. In the 
New Deal era President Roosevelt briefl y considered reviving NHI in his 1935 social 
security bill, which laid the basis of America’s welfare state. However, fearing that its 
political contentiousness might endanger other parts of the bill, he set it aside. As the 
New Deal gave way to wartime mobilization, Congressional Democrats tried again in 
1939 and 1943, though without success. Why the diff erent outcome? 
 First, there was no legitimation imperative, as the state did not confront a social dem-
ocratic political party threatening the status quo. Second, labour did not mobilize 
behind NHI. Like its European counterparts, it initially feared health insurance would 
undermine trade unionism and the struggle to raise wages. Moreover, existing indus-
trial sickness funds were extensive and robust and the Progressive alternative looked 
fi nancially unattractive. Th e scope for a solidaristic alliance with less fortunate groups 
was further narrowed in the 1930s and 1940s with the rapid rise of the voluntary sector 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield prepayment plans, widely off ered as a benefi t in the wartime 
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labour market. Th ird, institutional factors accorded hostile interests, such as employers, 
commercial insurers, and doctors, the opportunity to obstruct legislation. In particular, 
the wealth and organization of the American Medical Association (AMA) underpinned 
propaganda campaigns that infl uenced public opinion and stymied consensus, even 
against the wishes of the executive. Th e weak party whip permitted vested interests con-
siderable infl uence over legislators with Southern Democrats, notably impeding reform 
attempts in the mid-twentieth century. 23 
 Turning now from payment mechanisms to service provision, the early twentieth 
century also saw an increasing public role. In part this followed the concentration of 
expertise in the hospital, alongside technological changes such as laboratories, X-rays, 
and radiotherapy equipment. Th is broadened the social base of utilization: in Paris, for 
example, the proportion of births in hospital rose from about 55 in 1912 to 79 in 1919. 24 
Gradually the vestiges of refuge and stigma were shed from British workhouse infi rma-
ries, the French ‘ maison de pauvres ’, and major public hospitals in the United States. Th us 
in France a state-funded building programme underwrote departmental hospital cen-
tres and from 1926 opened public institutions to private or means-tested patients; as 
NHI expanded, so demeaning ‘assistance’ transmuted into ‘assurance’. In Britain many 
municipal hospitals were taken out of the poor law, bringing greater investment and 
integration with local voluntary institutions and medical schools. As in America, the 
voluntary/public distinction remained in place, though the rise in demand and escalat-
ing costs saw the dwindling of hospital philanthropy, to be replaced in Britain by the 
mass contributory schemes, and in the United States by Blue Cross, user fees, and indus-
trial pre-payment funds, such as the Kaiser plan introduced in 1938. 
 Th e interwar labour movement increasingly advocated access to health care, but with 
mixed results. In Britain, the Left  was uncertain whether to support the extension of 
NHI or a tax-funded local government service, and in the event it was Conservative leg-
islation that refashioned the poor law and expanded municipal medicine. Left ist initia-
tives elsewhere capitalized on the purchasing power of insurance funds. In Germany, 
the self-governing structure of the  Krankenkassen encouraged experiments that chal-
lenged the market in the interest of the patient. Th ese included eff orts to standardize 
prescription costs and the foundation of polyclinics run by salaried physicians and pro-
viding comprehensive services. Such innovations were condemned by local doctors as 
‘Marxist power lust’ and the profession subsequently aligned itself with the Nazis, bene-
fi ting from their purge of socialist fund representatives, as well as Jewish and radical 
doctors. 25 A ban on polyclinics, state control, and the loss of the workers’ majority 
quickly followed, though otherwise the core functions of NHI were compatible with the 
population policies of fascism. Similarly, in Japan communist-sponsored hospitals and 
clinics for farmers and workers mounted a short-lived challenge to private medicine 
before suppression in the 1930s. Here it was militarism, not socialism, which challenged 
the market, with the government’s ‘Healthy People, Healthy Soldiers’ programme driv-
ing health centre development, followed by the wartime nationalization of hospitals 
under the Japan Medical Corporation (1942). Th us although labour mobilization behind 
health systems reform was discernible by 1945, it was not a decisive force. 
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 1945–1975: Health systems in the ‘golden age’ 
 Growth economists characterize the three post-war decades as a ‘golden age’ in Western 
Europe and Japan, with per capita gross domestic product (GDP) rising at unprece-
dented rates between 1950 and 1973. 26 Prosperity was driven by many factors, including 
the impact of the Marshall Plan, technology transfers of American production tech-
niques, high investment rates, ample and mobile labour, and a long period of political 
stability founded on national institutions that sustained social consensus. Central to 
these were welfare states, and the keynote of this phase of health system development 
was expanded population coverage and escalating expenditure. Sturdy comparative data 
on health spending became available from 1960 and, as  Figures  24.1 and  24.2 show, this 
rise was evident in real terms and as proportion of GDP. Th e long-run climb in real 
expenditure refl ects two factors above all: the costs of the labour and technology of cura-
tive medicine; and the ever-growing demands arising from greater longevity and the 
heightened morbidity of old age. Th e diff ering national trajectories, however, demand 
explanation. 
 A combination of labour mobilization, solidarism, and institutional factors meant 
that Britain moved decisively away from its mixed economy of health care. At a stroke, 
the NHS (1948) brought universal coverage, funding from general taxation, and state 
provision of facilities free at the point of use. Th ough characteristically attributed to the 
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 figure 24.1 Per capita health expenditure in selected developed nations, US$ (purchasing 
power parity) at constant prices (1983).
 Source: OECD Health Data 2008—Selected Data. URL:  http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx 
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progressive Left , personifi ed by Labour’s Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, it built on 
bipartisan consensus. Broad support for welfarism was fostered by the 1942 Beveridge 
Report, (in which health barely fi gured), and while wartime social solidarity should not 
be exaggerated, an appetite for change produced a large Labour majority in the 1945 
election. Th is provided an opportunity for a decisive executive with a broadly united 
cabinet to carry a fundamental reform. Th ere were, however, limits to its radicalism. 
Private medicine was still permitted, with user fees soon returning for dentistry and pre-
scriptions, and there was no place for the grassroots participation hitherto encouraged 
by local politics or voluntary action. Alongside a ‘democratic defi cit’, the other serious 
charge is that Bevan’s model institutionalized frugality. As the expenditure data show, 
the single-payer system, where the Treasury set a global budget, was comparatively 
highly eff ective in cost containment. In the early years such parsimony was not politi-
cally problematic and aft er a straitened start investment began to fl ow to hospitals and 
primary care. 
 Elsewhere proposals for deep reform in the post-war moment had more muted 
results. Th e West German Left  pushed for a single insurance fund to replace the existing 
 Krankenkassen , with the prospect of monopoly power ensuring equitable benefi ts. 
However, the election of conservative Christian Democrats in 1949 meant that the sys-
tem was rebuilt on similar principles to the Nazi era. 27 Swedish socialists also proff ered a 
radical blueprint for replacing private medicine with a salaried service based in state 
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health centres. Th is time Sweden’s deliberative committee system allowed opponents to 
resist this, although 1955 saw the establishment of NHI with fee for service reimburse-
ment; universal coverage was achieved by 1962. In Japan too there was discussion of a 
national health service patterned on the wartime emergency structure, but this was 
blocked by American occupying forces. Hospitals reverted to private ownership and 
most physicians remained in private practice; the tripartite insurance structure stayed 
in place, with employer, government, and subsidized community funds. Post-war plan-
ners in France also created a new political and social compact, carried through by de 
Gaulle, who capitalized on a mood of national unity. Th e Social Security Law (1945) 
established compulsory health insurance run by statutory funds, under the democratic 
management of boards dominated by trade unions. Again though, radicalism was lim-
ited: coverage was not universal, medical practitioners continued to set billing levels, 
and the existence of co-payments guaranteed the survival of the  mutualités . 
 Th ese structures provided the basis on which universal coverage was achieved. 
Explanation emphasizes legitimation and social conciliation in Japan, with mandatory 
insurance fi nally introduced in 1958 by a conservative government aft er socialist elec-
toral success in rural areas. In France and West Germany, analysis highlights another 
solidaristic moment in the 1960s, when the relatively poor position with regard to wel-
fare entitlements of small businesses, the agricultural sector, and some professionals and 
managers prompted these groups fi nally to embrace statutory insurance. 28 Both nations 
achieved virtually complete coverage by the early 1970s. Only in America was a diff erent 
path taken. Here the post-war window had seen reform fall due to familiar institutional 
and pressure group factors, with AMA propaganda now playing on incipient Cold War 
sentiment to tarnish NHI as either socialist or fascistic. Other than federal support for 
hospital building, US policy now relied on the voluntary and private sectors to deliver 
population coverage. By the early 1960s, it was apparent that the post-war boom had 
extended this to only some 75 of the population and Democratic Congressional 
strength in the Johnson era, coupled with self-interested solidarism of older citizens, 
opened the way to new initiatives. Th is was the creation of Medicare, under which the 
elderly received medical benefi ts under Social Security and subsidized insurance, and of 
Medicaid, a limited safety net for the uninsured poor. 29 
 Th ese were the settings for the upward course of real expenditure. Th e higher costs of 
America’s system were evident by the 1960s, as providers responded to the new incen-
tives of Medicare reimbursement by increasing their activities. Japanese spending grew 
from a low base, its rise refl ecting expansion in privately owned hospital bed capacity 
and the decision in 1972 to lift  co-payments for the elderly, meeting excess costs from 
general taxation. As in Germany a stable corporatist negotiating structure allowed 
Japanese doctors and bureaucrats to agree a uniform fee schedule that moderated 
expenditure growth. France and Germany meanwhile, starting from a higher base, 
found the fee for service model infl ationary; Germany’s diff erentiation between the 
industrial and white-collar funds ( Ersatzkassen ), with high earners opting into private 
insurance, created a further ‘ratcheting up’ eff ect, as the better benefi ts enjoyed by the 
few were increasingly desired by the many. Like Japan, 1960s France took steps to rein 
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back doctors’ charging practices by compelling them to agree contracts with the  Sécurité 
Sociale , binding them to a fee schedule. Even so, practitioner earnings continued to rise 
as new technology allowed them to intensify their activities. Nor were the tax-based sys-
tems necessarily more restrained, as Sweden, which combined fee for service NHI reim-
bursement and county level tax-fi nancing, demonstrates. A combination of social 
democratic political control and traditional willingness to fund municipal hospitals 
kept spending high. Th e left ist hegemony also saw private medicine in retreat before a 
salaried service delivering care through public health centres and hospitals, though this 
did not restrain costs. Here and elsewhere, containment would not begin until changes 
in the macro-economic environment ended the expansionary phase. 
 1975–2005: Th e ‘crisis’ of the welfare state 
 Th e mid-1970s saw a halt to the era of buoyant economic growth. Investment rates fell, 
while oil shocks prompted escalating prices and wage demands, heralding a period in 
which infl ation and unemployment rose simultaneously. Th e social and political com-
pact sustaining welfare states began to founder as conservative politics returned, accom-
panied by neo-liberal critiques of ‘provider capture’ and bureaucratic infl exibility. 
Expenditure curbs and strategies to enhance effi  ciency therefore characterize this 
period, though diff erent approaches were employed and diff erent spending trajectories 
resulted. Despite all the talk of a fi scal and political crisis of the welfare state, overall 
health expenditures broadly maintained their upward course, as  Figures  24.1 and  24.2 
show. Th ese do not diff erentiate public from private spending, but if they did they would 
reveal a similar trend. In the United States, for example, the costs of Medicare, Medicaid, 
and other public programmes climbed from 2 of GDP in 1976, to 2.9 in 1989, to 4 by 
1993, and 5 in 2005. 30 Th is is because the infl ationary drivers of technological change in 
medical science and the demands of an ageing population still remained. Drug costs 
were a key factor, representing about 14 of health expenditures in the six countries, 
1980–2005. 
 Figures  24.1 and  24.2 also suggest that despite rising real costs states successfully 
reined back outlays as a proportion of national wealth, though chronologies of contain-
ment varied. Th e British single-payer system presented the Th atcher/Major govern-
ments with a lever to achieve this, though legitimation concerns compelled them to 
ensure the NHS’s core principles remained ‘safe with us’. 31 Policy therefore focused on 
lift ing productivity with fewer resources, initially through managerial reforms designed 
to improve cost-eff ectiveness. Next came a refashioning of governance structures to 
establish a quasi-market, in the expectation that internal commissioning would intro-
duce competitive effi  ciencies. Labour’s return brought higher investment but broad pol-
icy continuity, now with private sector contracting for capital projects and tougher 
regulation of drug treatments through the National Institute of Clinical Excellence. 
Sweden deployed similar policies. Ceilings on local taxation were imposed and hospital 
funding moved from a calculation based on patient visits to a more restrictive capitation 
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basis. Conservative revival in the 1990s brought experimentation with a British-style 
purchaser–provider split and the use of patient choice in elective surgery to instil com-
petitive incentives. Private medical practice in hospitals and health centres also re-
emerged, though here too the political premium on equity ensured the continuing 
predominance of public fi nancing and anxieties about spatial and social justice. 
 In countries that combined social insurance with predominantly private supply the 
focus was on the charging practices of health providers. Germany moved in the 1980s to 
enforceable regional budgetary caps, then to federal price setting of drug costs with co-
payments for expensive prescriptions. Th e peculiar challenge of integrating the East 
German system aft er reunifi cation (1990) was met by tightening reimbursement prac-
tices, for example fi xing fees according to diagnosis, and by the cross-subsidization of 
poorer funds by the wealthy. Th is cross-subsidization device had been tried earlier in 
Japan to tackle the disadvantage of community funds with greater numbers of elderly 
poor. As in Britain, a rightwards political shift  in the 1980s saw Japanese policy towards 
providers become more assertive, with a biennial price survey to hold down pharma-
ceutical costs and a stricter doctors’ fee schedule that compensated for the ‘natural 
increase’ in their volume of work. France too tackled doctors’ charges, here subject to 
upward pressure because supplementary insurance and co-payments encouraged bill-
ing in excess of approved fees. Tax and pension incentives now bound doctors into the 
fee schedule, while global budgets were set for hospitals in place of individual negotia-
tion. However, conservative attempts at imposing tighter controls in the 1990s were 
blocked by labour mobilization, aligned with the self-interest of practitioners. Juppé’s 
proposals included a national health budget, restrictions on clinical freedoms in respect 
of costly drugs and therapies, and limiting patients’ free choice of specialists. Th eir defeat 
left  France amongst the highest spending nations at the new millennium. 
 As to the biggest spender, why did the 1980s see America’s medical costs diverge irre-
versibly from its peers? Th e pursuit of profi t in private health care had intensifi ed as 
large corporations superseded small fi rms in hospital management and supplies, forc-
ing non-profi t providers towards more commercial practices. President Reagan’s intro-
duction of a European-style fee schedule for Medicare reimbursement (1983) could not 
stifl e infl ationary pressures, which now came from new, largely private sector actors, the 
Health Maintenance Organizations, introduced by President Nixon to encourage mem-
bership of group prepayment plans. Nor had these solved the problem of incomplete 
coverage and the Clinton presidency began with a complex health reform proposal. Th is 
suggested mandatory employer contributions and state-level ‘alliances’ to achieve uni-
versalism, and federal regulation of private plans to control costs. As previously though, 
the favourable conjunction of circumstances required for success was absent. Solidaristic 
support was elusive, with labour already alienated aft er Clinton’s embrace of free trade 
and the comfortable middle class fearful of new spending obligations, thanks to the 
Republican legacy of public indebtedness. Institutional and pressure group factors also 
resurfaced, this time with insurers leading the propaganda war and conservative 
Democrats from the South and West once more undermining congressional party unity. 
Again reform prospects faded and incomplete coverage remained. By 2006, 46 million 
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Americans lacked health insurance and the promise of another reform attempt was cen-
tral to Democratic resurgence under Barack Obama. His Patient Protection and 
Aff ordable Care Act of 2010 (to be phased in by 2014) aimed to extend cover and restrain 
costs. Th e strategy was to expand coverage under the private insurance industry, using a 
mix of subsidies, incentives, and mandates on individuals and employers, and to increase 
consumer protection for the insured. A more radical option suggested by the President, 
of a public health insurance plan that might have competed with private providers, was 
rejected by Congress. Despite this, the Act provoked great political bitterness and was 
met by threats of repeal by Republicans. 
 Conclusion 
 By the later twentieth century, then, advanced capitalist nations all operated health 
 systems that combined insurance, tax-funded provision, and private medicine, though 
the mix of elements varied substantially. In considering how and why the diff erent 
national health systems developed, these limited case studies illustrate the combination 
of pressures—political, institutional, economic, industrial, military, ideological, and 
professional—which could determine diverse outcomes. Nonetheless, readers may be 
asking themselves at this point whether any of this really matters. Did the type of system 
adopted have any bearing on national population health? 
 International comparison to address this question has until recently relied on the 
gold standard indicators of life expectation and infant mortality rates (IMR). Th ese 
are shown for the case study countries in  Table  24.1 and demonstrate that all experi-
enced improvements. Yet they also reveal that by the end of the twentieth century, the 
United States fared comparatively poorly in demographic terms, despite its far higher 
costs, while of the lower spenders, the United Kingdom had become worse off  than 
Japan, which by the 1980s enjoyed the best indicators. Of the higher spenders, Sweden, 
with greater tax-funding and state ownership, consistently outperformed the social 
insurance nations, France and Germany. Of course, more comparators are needed to 
permit generalization and a recent survey of twenty-one European countries sought 
defi nitively to adjudicate between NHS-style and social insurance models, using time 
series data for 1970–2003. 32 Th e broad conclusion was that both types of health system 
were converging with respect to life expectation and IMR, but that the social insur-
ance nations historically had a slight edge. Otherwise, NHS models were better at 
cost-containment, though with risks of under-spending, and incurred greater patient 
dissatisfaction. 
 Arguably, though, the standard indicators are misleading guides of health system 
productivity. Aft er all, public health academics have long argued that curative services 
made only a modest contribution to the modern mortality transition and that factors 
ranging from income inequality to environment and individual behaviour were the key 
determinants of levels of sickness. 33 For example, did American excess mortality result 
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in part from the unusually high tobacco consumption of earlier birth cohorts; and did 
Japanese longevity owe something to benign dietary habits? 
 In response to such criticism researchers have developed smarter metrics to iso-
late the contribution made by health care. This builds on the broad consensus,  pace 
McKeown, that in the post-war period there are certain diseases whose outcomes 
were clearly affected by the curative services. 34 One strategy has been to monitor 
mortality and survival rates from different cancers. Another has been to derive a 
composite death rate from a group of diseases whose progress is deemed amenable 
to health services intervention. 35 Robust comparative data on ‘amenable mortality’ 
only extend back about thirty years but a key finding is that it has contributed sig-
nificantly to rising life expectation, particularly through the impact of health serv-
ices on infant mortality. Amenable mortality also provides a more sensitive gauge of 
comparative performance and  Table  24.1 shows recent rates and rankings of the case 
study countries. France, which as we have seen was a higher spending, social insur-
ance nation that historically set great store on patient choice and clinical autonomy, 
emerges as a top performer. Britain, a NHS system that has arguably been chroni-
cally underfunded, does poorly, though continuing improvement and the moderate 
rise in rankings by 2002–3 may reflect Blair’s investment hike. The United States, 
the highest spender with its historic attachment to market solutions, also fares badly, 
inviting the judgement that lack of universal coverage has disadvantaged its 
citizens. 
 Such assessments, however, move from the realm of historical appraisal to epidemio-
logical controversy and ultimately political argument. Others can and will disagree. A 
more modest conclusion is that the historical developments described here remain rele-
vant, because health systems  do matter to the people’s health. Yet as we have seen, an 
unalloyed concern to achieve the best possible standards for its citizens was rarely gov-
ernment’s top priority in the political economy of health care. 
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